Learning from rare events: an analysis of ValuJet Flight 592 and Swissair Flight SR 111 crashes by Grigoriou, Konstantinos et al.
Learning from Rare Events: An Analysis of ValuJet Flight 592 and 
Swissair Flight SR 111 Crashes 
Konstantinos Grigoriou, Ashraf Labib*, Sara Hadleigh-Dunn  
University of Portsmouth, UK 
 
E-mail addresses:  
konstantinos.grigoriou@myport.ac.uk  (K. Grigoriou ) 
ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk (A. Labib)  
sara.hadleigh-dunn@port.ac.uk (S. Hadleigh-Dunn) 
 
Corresponding author: Ashraf Labib 
 
Abstract: 
Why do organisations need to learn from prior failures in this uncertain and complex 
environment? How can they learn from prior failures? This paper aims to answer the above 
questions using the relevant literature and by analysing two cases from the aviation industry. 
To achieve this, Fault Tree Analyses and Reliability Block Diagram will be applied to 
ValuJet Flight 592 and Swissair Flight SR111 crashes to identify their root causes and discuss 
the lessons learned or not learned.  Thus, learning from failures using advanced techniques do 
not only indicates the root causes of the disaster but increase the knowledge of the 
organisation as they can identify the gaps in their system and learn from them. 
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Common sense suggests that failure is something bad and must be avoided, as failure 
challenge organisations, their people, functions and processes unusual.  Mirvis and Berg 
(1977) argued that “especially in organisations, failure is often simply not tolerated, and 
people avoid being associated with failure of any kind”.  However, researchers also found 
that learning from prior failures is more effective than successes (Madsen & Desai, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, it can be noticed that the lessons gained from previous failures have not been 
learnt as the same disasters are keeping occurred by the same companies (E.g. BP Texas City, 
and Deep Water Horizon), within the same industry (E.g. Chernobyl and Fukushima in 
nuclear power plants). This paper aims to examine whether and how organisations learn from 
major failures. A critical literature review will give a better understanding of what is 
organisational learning, why it is more effective to learn from prior failures than successes 
and the unlearning process.  Moreover, two cases from the aviation industry, ValuJet Flight 
592 and Swissair Flight SR 111, will be analysed using the framework of learning from 
failures proposed by Labib and Read (2013) and the use of two engineering failure analysis 
techniques; Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD).   
Considering that there are several reliability engineering-based tools and techniques, the 
justification for using FTA and RBD is three-fold; i) the FTA is used for problem structuring 
for identifying root cause analysis, whereas the RBD is used as a problem solving technique 
to identify the vulnerabilities within the system, ii) they are compatible to one another, where 
the FTA is a pre-requisite to the RBD, and hence can be used in an integrated approach, and 
iii) both the FTA and RND have been used as a way of demonstrating hybrid modelling for 
engineering failure analysis, for example: (Yunusa-Kaltungo etal, 2017),  (Stephen and 
Labib, 2018), (Labib and Read, 2013), and (Labib and Read, 2015). 
The paper is constructed as follows; section two is dedicated to literature review. Section 
three provides the theoretical framework and case studies using the proposed analytical tools 
and techniques. Finally section four prvide a discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature review section  is constructed as follows; we divided it into two main 
subsections; on organisational learning, and learning from success or failure. The latter subsection 
is further divided into learning from success, learning from failure, and learning from engineering 
failures analysis 
 
2.1 Organisational learning 
 
Nowadays, it is very important that both individuals and organisations must learn 
systematically and rigorously from their own or other’s experiences in order to adapt rapidly 
and continuously to their changing environments (Senge, 2006).  The concept of 
organisational learning is rooted in many aspects of management and its practices 
acknowledge a broad range of factors by specifying the learning results (Garratt, 1999, 
p.203).  The organisational learning can be considered as a tool for business success where it 
is widely accepted that it is a necessary strategy for the survival and the development of the 
organisation (Beer et al., 2005).   
 
However, there is an interesting dilemma for the organisational learning as there are limited 
theories and models which are acceptable. During the years, scholars have referred to 
learning as; new systems, new structures, new insights or knowledge, or mere actions 
(Chandler, 1962; Miles & Cameron, 1982; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Cyert & March, 1963).  
More recently, Madsen and Desai (2010, p.453) defined the organizational learning as “any 
modification of an organization’s knowledge occurring as a result of its experience”.  Any 
changes in the organisational knowledge are difficult to be observed, but the empirical 
literature of the organisational learning suggests that changes in observable organisational 
performance reflect changes in organisational knowledge (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Argote, 
1999). 
 
Organisational learning theory pointing the importance of knowledge storage and knowledge 
development in organisations by including the knowledge-based theory of the company, 
evolutionary economics and theory on organisational memory, shared cognition and group 
learning (Kogut & Zander, 1996; Grant, 1996; Stalk et al., 1992). Therefore, learning from 
the organisation’s extreme performance such as success or failure experiences had increased 
the attention of scholars and organisations itself (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Greve, 2003; Miner 
et al., 1996).   
 
 
2.2 Learning from success or failure: 
 
Although empirical literature emphasizes learning from success (McGrath, 1999; Kim & 
Miner, 2000), recent scholars began to explore organisational learning from failure 
experience (Kim & Miner, 2007; Desai, 2008; Madsen & Desai, 2010). Audia and Goncalo 
(2007) and Baum and Dahlin (2007) found that successful experiences leading organisations 
to search for minor performance improvements while failure experiences drive organisations 
to search for new ideas beyond their boundaries.  Louis and Sutton (1991) claimed that the 
unexpected events stimulate increased sense-making efforts, intensify the attribution process 
and enhance the process of hypothesis testing.     
 
2.2.1 Learning from success 
 
Failures are different from successes not only from the number of errors that drive to 
performance outcome but also because failure events are treated as opposed to successes.  
This can be proved by the behavioural theory of the company, which shows that the response 
of the organisational decision makers on failure is different from success (Madsen & Desai, 
2010). Decision makers of an organisation construe experience from success as evidence that 
there is no need for any further development of organisational knowledge as the existing 
knowledge of the organisation represents the world well (March & Shapira, 1992; Lant, 
1992; Louis & Sutton, 1991). Thus, the organisational decision makers tend to simplify their 
approaches to decision-making and fail to receive information about the outside world when 
learning from prior successes (Hayward et al., 2004; Audia et al., 2000).  
 
2.2.2 Learning from failure 
 
On the other hand, as an event of success tends to stabilize the organisation’s knowledge, 
failure challenges it.  Failures challenge the old assumptions and status quo, motivates the 
organisational members to innovate and correct problems (Sitkin, 1992; Cyert & March, 
1963) and force organisational members to engage in deep or mindful reflections on what is 
wrong and why to represents better the reality (Weick & Roberts, 1993; Morris & Moore, 
2000).  Moreover, failure events not only indicate a gap in the knowledge of the organisation 
but also in many cases provides a clear identification of the roots of that gap (Turner, 1976; 
Levinthal & March 1981).  Experiences from failure have been related to increased risk 
seeking, the same as success experiences have been related to increased risk aversion (Sitkin, 
1992). The ability of the organisation to take risks and admit to failure and learn from it are 
the keys to achieve high performance and sustainability (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Peters et al., 
1982).   
 2.2.3 Learning from Engineering Failures Analysis 
Learning from engineering failure analysis has been investigated by a large body of literature 
in the journal of Engineering Failure Analysis. Ahmad etal (2012) investigated a case study 
of multiple failures modes of a machinery component. Chemweno etal (2016) proposed a root 
cause analysis methodology for selection of maintenance strategy. Gharahasanlou etal (2014) 
used fault tree analysis for a crushing plant and mixing bed hall. Martinez etal (2018) 
performed failure analysis of subsidence in a power plant. Mesic and Plavsic (2013) analysed 
failures of transmission network maintenance preferential. Mulenga etal (2018)  investigated 
root cause analysis of asbestos cement pipes case study. Murugan and Ramasamy (2015) 
performed failure analysis of power transformers. Yunusa-Kaltungo etal (2017) investigated 
critical failures using root cause analysis techniques such as fault tree analysis and reliability 
block diagrams for a case study in a cement company. 
2.3 The unlearning process 
 
However, Qi et al. (2012) in their article ‘Challenges and needs for process safety in the new 
millennium’ argued that similar incidents are occurring on a regular basis.  This happens due 
to the lack of understanding of urgency to search for better practices which lead to 
organisations improvements. Qi et al. (2012) suggested three key reasons why organisations 
do not learn from prior failures.  Firstly, the organisations have no memory and they must 
focus more on the past by performing root cause analysis of near misses, investigations and 
estimate the probabilities of major failures occurrences.  Second, the organisations ignore the 
red flags and do not focus on the leading indicators of the disaster.  The last challenge is the 
lack of communication between the organisation’s employees and management and the 
increasing complexity of process operations.   
Major failures, by their definition, are rare events of severe consequences. They are therefore 
usually ‘black swans’, a term coined by Taleb (2005), or an ‘out-of-the-blue’ event as argued 
by as argued by Komljenovice etal (2017, 2016), who proposed that they also occur due to an 
unlearning process that may be due to: a) unknown-unknowns (incidents that are completely 
unknown to the scientific community), b) unknown-knowns (analysts and those involved in 
the incident do not possess  knowledge about a related issue but others do), and c) failure 
modes that are on the list of known risk, but judged as ‘acceptable’). 
It is clear from the above-mentioned literature in both sections related to organisational 
learning, and learning from success and failure, that the majority of the literature tends to be 
conceptual with limited empirical, case study, oriented research. In this paper we contribute 
to this gap by demonstrating the incorporation of the same hybrid techniques in two case 
studies and identify their utility by way of illustration. 
 
3. Theoretical framework and case studies 
 
In this paper two cases from the aviation industry, ValuJet Flight 592 and Swissair Flight SR 
111, were chosen to demonstrate learning from failure using the proposed framework of 
Labib and Read (2013) which consists of a) feedback from the users to design (ie changing 
the status quo), b) incorporation of engineering failure analysis tools, and c) the fostering of 
interdisciplinary approaches and extraction of generic lessons learnt. The Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) will be used here to analyse the cases by 
developing a hybrid model in order to increase the richness of the analyses.  By using a single 
model to analyse a problem can be inadequate to provide a realistic and an effective approach 
to represent complex realities, as the people who investigate the accident try to ‘fit it’ into the 
model (Kletz, 2001).  The FTA will be used to identify the causal factors of both cases by 
distinguishing the direct and indirect causes of each event and how interacted together.  Labib 
and Read (2015) argued that the above process of categorising the direct and indirect causes 
of a disaster is very useful when analysing cases in aviation, so the two cases have been 
chosen to support this argument.   
  
 
3.1 Case 1 – ValuJet Flight 592 
 
3.1.1 What happened 
 
On May 11, 1996, a Douglas DC-9-32 operated by ValuJet Airline, Inc., as Flight 592 
scheduled to depart from Miami International Airport, Florida, to Hartsfield International 
Airport, Georgia, carrying 110 people on board and 4,109 pounds of cargo (baggage, mail 
and company-owned material (COMAT)).  The Flight 592 departed from Miami at 14:04:24, 
where shortly after the take off an unidentified sound recorded in the cockpit’s voice 
recorder.  At 14:10:20, the captain shouted, “We’re losing everything” and requested 
emergency landing as an unexpected fire broke out from the airplane’s cargo, causing heavy 
electrical problems (NTSB, 1997).  Finally, at 14:13:12, ValuJet Flight 592 crashed into the 
Everglades coast in Florida.  
 
 
3.1.2 Logic and Technical cause of the failure 
 
An unexpected fire in the aircraft’s class D 
cargo compartment was the main cause of 
the Flight 592 accident.  Over 100 expired 
chemical oxygen generators were loaded 
into the aircraft improperly as cargo by 
ValuJet's maintenance subcontractor 
(SubreTech).  The fire resulted from the 
actuation of one or more oxygen 
generators (see fig. 1) and propagated from 
other flammable materials in the cargo 
(NTSB, 1997). The fire caused heavy electrical problems to the airplane’s systems, hence the 
pilots were unable to control it. 
 
According to the final investigation report produced by the National Transportation Safety 
Board (1997), there are several causes were contributed to the accident of the airplane. 
 
a) The failure of ValuJet’s maintenance subcontractor to prepare, package and identify 
the unexpected chemical generator before presenting them for carriage. 
 
Fig. 1. NSTB photo of recovered chemical  
oxygen generator 
b) The failure of ValuJet to oversee its maintenance subcontractor in order to ensure 
compliance with maintenance training and hazardous materials practices and 
requirements. 
 
c) The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) failed to require fire suppression and 
smoke detection systems in class D cargo compartments. 
 
d) The FAA failed to respond to prior similar incidents.  
 
e) The FAA failed to oversee ValuJet’s responsibilities and maintenance programs. 
 
f) The failure of ValuJet to ensure that both ValuJet and its contract maintenance 
employees were aware of the ‘no-carry’ hazardous materials policy and had the 
appropriate training in terms of hazardous materials.    
 
3.1.3 The consequences of the failure 
 
The crash of Flight 592 caused the death of 110 people, 5 crew members and 105 passengers, 
and the cost of $14 million for recovery and clean-up operations (NTSB, 1997). Moreover, 
the accident caused reputational damage to SabreTech and ValuJet as Sabretech ceased 
operations and ValuJet bought out by AirTran. 
 
3.1.4 FTA and RBD for ValuJet Flight 592 crash 
 
The FTA is a top-down approach which shows the relationship of the system’s failure.  On 
the top of the tree is the undesirable event (Top event) followed by failures of the components 
of the system, called basic events of the tree.  The choice of relation between factors is depicted 
in the choice of logic connectors in the FTA ie OR / AND gates. The AND-gates and OR-gates 
connect the causes of the Top event.  Moreover, AND-gates show that the system 
configuration is in ‘parallel’, and OR-gates show that the system is in ‘series’ structure. Such 
combination of parallel and series structures are then mapped into the subsequent equivalent 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) model.  The FTA shown in Figure (2) shows the direct and 
indirect causes of the Flight 592 crash resulted from the unexpected fire. Firstly, the usage of 
the AND-gate shows that both direct and indirect causes have contributed simultaneously to 
the incident.  The occurrence of any of the events, 1 or 2, will be resulted to the failure of the 
maintenance side to comply with hazardous materials, hence the reasoning behind the OR-
gate. The lack of supervision, poor safety culture and lack of communication had a direct 
impact on the incident as the management failed to oversee the maintenance operations, 
safety and knowledge. Also, the occurrence of the events 6 and 7 contributed to the poor 
design of the aircraft which failed to detect and extinguish the fire immediately.  In terms of 
the indirect causes, the FAA failed to respond to prior similar incidents and failed to monitor 
ValuJet’s maintenance and responsibilities.  Finally, Valujet’s and SubreTech’s employees 
failed to comply with the hazardous materials policy. Please note that the expert input sought 





Moreover, all the information from the FTA used as an input to the RBD shown in Fig. (3) 
where the AND-gate on the top of the tree shows its parallel structure.  The RBD makes the 
analyses more valuable as it highlights vulnerabilities in the whole system and hence 
indicates to decision makers on what events one should focus on to improve the resilience of 
the system.  The decision makers must decrease the number of the series events to maximise 
the system’s reliability and minimise the system’s failure rate.  From the RBD, it can be 
Fig. 2. FTA of ValuJet Flight 592 crash-fire 
noticed that the maintenance fault it is the main cause of worry as the event 1 and 2 form a 
series. 
 





3.1.5 Proposed improvements and generic lessons 
 
From the above analyses, it can be noticed that there is a need to address some important 
points to prevent similar incidents in the future. Firstly, there is a need for smoke detectors 
Fig. 3. RBD of ValuJet Flight 592 crash-fire 
and fire suppression systems in the cargo hold. This will help to detect and extinguish the fire 
immediately, hence the flight crew will have valuable time to land the plane safely.  Also, the 
airline companies must enhance and evaluate their oversight techniques in order to avoid 
improper maintenance activities, such as false entries.  Finally, the FAA must require airline 
companies to ensure that their maintenance stuff, including shipping, mechanics, receiving 
and subcontractors are fully trained for the recognition, packaging and shipment of hazardous 
materials.     
 
3.2 Case 2 – Swissair Flight SR 111 
 
3.2.1 What happened 
 
At 00:18 on 2 of September 1998, a Douglas MD-11 operated by Swissair Airline as SR 111 
departed from Jamaica International Airport, New York, to Geneva, Switzerland, carrying 
229 people on board.  At 01:10:38, an unusual smell and smoke detected in the cockpit but 
ignored from the pilots as they assumed that it is related to the air conditioning system (TSB, 
2001).  Four minutes later the smoke increased, and the captain requested an emergency 
landing to the closest airport.  The pilots named Boston airport but several minutes later they 
preferred to land in Halifax airport which was closer, loosing valuable time.  At 01:24:53, 
several minutes before landing, the captain started to dump fuel to avoid any further fire or 
explosions as some fire was visible above the cockpit.  Three minutes later, the control of the 
aircraft lost as the fire caused heavy electrical problems and the captain declared an 
emergency.  Finally, at 01:31:18, the flight SR 111 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean southwest 






 3.2.2 Logic and Technical cause of the failure 
 
The main cause of the Flight SR 111 
crash was a fire above the ceiling of the 
cockpit resulted from an arcing in the 
wiring of the airplane’s entertainment 
network which propagated by 
flammable materials (see fig. 4). The 
flammable materials contributed to the 
rapid spread of the fire causing heavy 
problems to the aircraft’s systems, 
hence led to the failure to control the 
aircraft.  
 
According to the final investigation report produced by the Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB) (2001), there are several causes of the aircraft’s accident. 
a) Metallized polyethylene terephthalate (MPET), silicone elastomeric and caps, hook-
and-loop fasteners and other materials did not meet the proposed revised flammability 
test criteria. 
b) The types of circuit breakers (CB) used were not capable to protect against all types 
of wiring arcing events. 
c) There were no fire suppression and smoke detection systems and policies. 
d) The airplane crew did not have the required training and procedures to locate and 
eliminate the source of smoke.   
e) Aircraft certification standards for flammable materials were inadequate, as they did 
not restrict the use of flammable materials.  




Fig. 4. The probable wire which caused the spark 
3.2.3 The consequences of the failure 
 
The crash of flight SR 111 caused the death of all the 229 people on board, 14 crew members 
and 215 passengers (TSB, 2001). Moreover, there was not any environmental damage from 
the aircraft’s crash, but the surrounding area of the incident was closed by marine traffic due 
to salvage operations for 13 months. 
3.2.4 FTA and RBD for Swissair Flight SR 111 crash 
The FTA shown in Fig. (5) shows the direct and indirect causes of Flight SR 111 crash 
resulted from fire by an arcing in the wiring. The first direct cause of the fire was the bad 
design of the aircraft where the incapable circuit breaks of the wires, the use of flammable 
materials and the lack of safety linked with an AND-gate as occurred simultaneously. The 
use of flammable materials is evidenced by the event 2,3 and 4, and the lack of safety by the 
event 5 and 6.  The next direct cause of the fire was the faults from the flight crew as they 
made wrong decisions and they did not detect and extinguish the fire.  The occurrence of any 
of the events 8,9 or 10 would result in the failure of the flight crew to detect and extinguish 
the fire, hence the reasoning behind the OR-gate. 
  
 
Moreover, all the events that fall under the indirect causes occurred simultaneously, hence the 
usage of the AND-gate.  The air traffic control had inadequate training during an emergency 
or abnormal situation.  Also, the lack of safety culture is evidenced by the inadequate aircraft 
certification standards for flammable materials, no firefighting plan and no flammable 
materials policy.  All the information from the FTA had used as an input to the RBD shown 
in Fig. (6) where the AND-gate on the top of the tree shows its parallel structure.  From the 
following RBD, it can be noticed that the events 8, 9 and 10 form series configuration, so the 
attention must be concentrated on why the flight crew failed to detect and extinguish the fire 
immediately.    
Fig. 5. FTA of Swissair Flight SR 111 crash-fire 
 Fig. 6. RBD of Swissair Flight SR 111 crash-fire 
 3.2.5 Improvements and generic lessons 
 
To prevent similar incidents in the future, again there is a need for smoke detectors and fire 
suppression systems in the hidden areas of the airplanes, so the flight crew would be alerted 
to the presence of the fire.  Also, there is a need of the FAA to require changes on standards, 
policies and regulations on airplanes wiring and flammable materials, as the aircraft 
certification standards for material flammability were inadequate. Moreover, the FAA must 
require replacing of the flammable materials, such as the metallized polyethylene 
terephthalate, and check the flammability of the replace materials by the necessary tests.  
Finally, as mentioned above there is a need to increase the knowledge of the flight crew in 
terms of fire and emergency situations by providing them with the necessary training and 
procedures, as well as with a comprehensive firefighting plan.  
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In terms of the above analysis, the construction of the FTA and RBD helped to understand 
the overall system and to identify the gaps where the organisational members need to focus in 
order to avoid any similar incidents in the future.  However, “those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana, 1998).  It is very important to note that both 
crashes had similar root causes with the top event the fire in the aircraft.  Therefore, it can be 
noticed that the lessons have not been learnt as the Flight SR 111 crashed two years after the 
crash of Flight 592.  This can be proved by the above analysis as after the accident of Flight 
592 it is not clear whether the authorities and the airlines have proceeded to any changes in 
order to avoid similar future incidents.  These changes could be 1) the better design and 
safety of the airplanes as smoke detection and fire suppression systems could alert the flight 
crew immediately and extinguish the fire, 2) more effective maintenance supervision and 
communication, 3) better training in terms of events of fire, emergencies and hazardous and 
flammable materials and 4) the authorities must require standards, policies and regulations 
related to the above incidents.   
One however, may wonder whether by applying these methods, do they reach the same 
conclusions as for the original case in terms of the root causes deduced by investigators when 
analysing the accident cases?  In response to this point, we argue that they do concur with 
similar conclusions derived from investigation reports, but they offer the added benefit of 
having a concise mental model that clearly summarises the root causes of the whole event 
from the FTA. In addition, the RBD also offers insight into the vulnerabilities of the system, 
which may not be explicitly captured in the investigation reports.  
The main limitation of this work is that it relies on the robustness of the problem structuring 
phase, ie the construction of the FTA model. We constructed the FTA model based on the 
data available in investigation reports, but it is based on our interpretation and our 
background. Usually such task should be carried out by multidisciplinary teams as suggested 
in Labib and Harris (2015), and Labib (2014). However, the main contribution of this work is 
that we offer a framework for root cause analysis, and identification of vulnerabilities within 
the whole system. 
Finally, the overall message of this paper is to understand the importance to identify the root 
causes of a disaster and be able to learn from it in order to ensure success and resilience of 
the organisations in this uncertain world.  The importance of formulating a problem can be 
regarded as the most significant issue which was suggested many years ago by Einstein and 
Infield (1938) as they noted that “The formulation of a problem is often more essential than 
its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill”.  The use 
of both techniques, FTA and RBD, had enriched the analysis as they demonstrated how an in-
depth root cause analysis can provide a very useful mental model which increases the 
knowledge and support decisions in organisations. However, such techniques have limitations 
as Leveson (2004, p.240) argued that “as such, event-based models encourage limited notions 
of causality—usually linear causality relationships are emphasized—and it is difficult to 
incorporate non-linear relationships, including feedback”. Nevertheless, they provide a 
valuable mental model that can lead to the enhancement of the resilience of systems.    
Future directions of research can incorporate the use of other tools and techniques for similar 
types of case studies. Such techniques may include the incorporation of fuzzy logic 
(Yuniarto, and Labib, 2006), the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) (Labib and Shah, 2001), 
integer programming (Alardhi and Labib, 2008), and dominance rough set approach (DRSA) 
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